Abstract-Membership revocation is practically necessary for group signature schemes. At present, most revocable group signature schemes are based on ROM model and many standard model group signature schemes do not support revocation. We present a novel and general revocation method for standard model group signature scheme based on length-reducing commitment and GrothSahai proof system, and demonstrate its usage by adding revocation capability to the Groth's full secure group signature scheme. The new method supports two different kinds of linkability for members when signing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Group signature was introduced by Chaum and Heyst in 1991 [1] . Since it combined anonymity and traceability, it soon became a central cryptographic primitive, of which many applications had been found such as e-cash, e-voting and trust computing etc.
As pointed out in [2] , one of the major issues for group signature's practical application is the ability to revoke a member when he becomes malicious or when he leaves the group deliberately.
Currently most revocable group signature schemes are based on ROM model such as [3, 4, 5] . Since ROM model can only provide heuristic security, recently there are many works on constructing cryptographic schemes without ROM such as [6, 7] . For standard model group signature schemes such as [8, 9, 10] , revocation is not supported. In [11] , an ID-based revocable group signature was presented. However the drawback of the scheme in [11] is that the GM (Group Manager) has to be online when signing.
In this paper, we present a novel and general revocation method for standard model group signature, which is based on a length-reducing commitment scheme [12] and Groth-Sahai proof system [13] , and demonstrate its usefulness by adding revocation ability to the wellknown Groth's full secure standard model group signature scheme [10] .
We note that recently in [14] , a highly efficient revocable group signature scheme in standard model was introduced, which was based on broadcast encryption and concise vector commitment. But their revocation is based on assumptions like FlexDHE etc., while our scheme is based on the standard DLIN assumption. Moreover, their method is not easily adapted to other standard model group signatures like [8, 9, 10] , since they use broadcast encryption techniques which is a departure from traditional group signature construction. Our revocation method is conceptually simpler and can be used in more scenarios such as [8, 9] .
The general idea is simple. GM publishes a short commitment which contains all the public keys of legal members and gives each member a witness. Then when making group signatures, legal member has to prove that his public key is included in the commitment using the witness he got from the GM. We use Groth-Sahai NIWI/NIZK proof system to achieve anonymity. To revoke a member, GM makes another commitment excluding the member's public key. Hence this member lost its signing right. The whole idea is like the DA (Dynamic Accumulator) revocation method in ROM model [3] . We realize it in standard model, although the cost is not as efficient as the ROM DA method. This paper is organized as follows. In section II we introduce the tools we used for the construction of this new method. The concrete construction is given in section III. In section IV we analyze its securities, and efficiency issues are discussed and compared in section V. Then we make a conclusion in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce assumptions and cryptographic tools used for the construction of our new revocation method.
Bilinear groups: Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be groups of order p. A bilinear map e: G 1 × G 2 → G T must satisfy the following:
(1) For arbitrary 
Homomorphic, Trapdoor and Length-reducing Commitment
In [12] , the authors put forward a homomorphic, trapdoor and length-reducing commitment scheme, which is proved to be both hiding and binding based on the DBP (Double Pairing) assumption.
To set up the scheme, generate groups with bilinear maps e: 1 × 2 → T . The public key for this commitment scheme is ck=(G R ,G 1 
, the trapdoor is tk=(x 1 ,…,x n ). To commit to 
using tk. This trapdoor opening is valid since:
Groth-Sahai Proof System
Groth-Sahai proof [13] is the first efficient NIWI/NIZK proof system for a large class of quadratic equations in bilinear groups, esp. in standard model without ROM. It can be realized in a couple of different assumptions such as DLIN, SXDH and subgroup decision etc. Here we introduce the instantiation based on DLIN assumption.
To set up the proof system, generate prime order groups with bilinear map e: G × G →G T . And set the CRS (Common Reference String) as
(1,1, )
with r, s, t ← Z p * , where ⊙ stands for component wise product. 3 f can be set in two different yet indistinguishable ways, which give perfect sound setting and WI setting respectively. In the perfect sound setting, set
and can be decrypted by using 1 1 2 2 log , log
In the WI setting, 1 2 3 , , f f f are linear independent vectors and C is a perfectly hiding commitment. Under DLIN assumption, these two different are computationally indistinguishable.
To commit an element x in Z p , compute 1 2
, with a CRS including 1 2 , , f f ψ . Similarly as above, ψ can be set up with two different ways to achieve WI and soundness setting respectively. For soundness setting To prove the committed variables satisfy a set of quadratic equations, the prover generates one proof element (which may include a couple of group elements) per equation in a way so that NIWI/NIZK is achieved.
Such NIWI/NIZK proofs are available for PPE (Pairing Production Equations) and multi-exponential equations. Here PPE means:
And multi-exponential equations are: 
SPS based on DLIN
SPS (Structure Preserving Signature) means that the signature, public key and message are all elements of a bilinear group, and the verification procedure is nothing but checking a couple of PPEs (Pairing Product Equations). The purpose of SPS is to combine with Groth-Sahai proof system [13] to prove that the prover hold a valid signature/message pair in a zero-knowledge way. So SPS can be used in many anonymous and privacy-preserving scenarios.
In [17] , a SPS scheme based on Decision Linear assumption was presented. The SPS is based on binary Merkle tree [18] by transforming a one-time signature scheme. On the tree, every node has its own public/private key pair (vk, sk), and parent node's private key is used to sign the public key of child node to authenticate the child node. The leaf node is used to sign messages. The leaf node's public key is authenticated by the nodes on the path from this leaf node up to the root. To verify a message/signature pair, just verify the d (Height of the tree) one-time signatures on path from root to the leaf.
Since it is structure preserving, we can prove that we hold a message/signature pair anonymously by using Groth-Sahai's NIWI/NIZK proof system. It was shown in [17] 
Intuitively this set of PPEs proves that from the root to a leaf, the prover has all the one-time signatures and thus he holds a valid message/signature pair according to the public key of the SPS scheme.
III. CONSTRUCTION
Weak Commitment Scheme
The homomorphic, trapdoor and length-reducing commitment scheme mentioned above work in asymmetric bilinear groups, in which G 1 , G 2 are different and there are no efficiently computable homomorphism between G 1 and G 2 . And its security is based on DBP assumption, which is implied by DDH assumption in G 1 [12] .
In our construction we use a variant of this commitment scheme, which works in symmetric bilinear groups, where DDH is easy in the based group G. This variant cannot be proved to be a secure commitment scheme based on any standard assumption. But we do prove that it satisfies a weaker security property which is sufficient for our revocation purpose based on DLIN assumption, as shown in the next section.
To set up this weak commitment scheme, generate prime order bilinear groups G, G T 
n n
Revocation to the Groth's Full Secure Group Signature
We introduce our new revocation method by adding revocation ability to the well-known Groth's full secure group signature scheme [10] , to sign G 1 ,G 2 ,G 3 ,G 4 ,…,G n . The purpose of these signatures is for set membership proof as in [19] . I.e. a user can commit to a G i ∈ {G 1 ,G 2 ,G 3 ,G 4 ,…,G n }, to prove that the committed value is indeed one of the G 1 ,G 2 ,G 3 ,G 4 ,…,G n , he can show that he holds a SPS signature of the committed value by Groth-Sahai's NIWI/NIZK proof system. Since the SPS we used is based on Merkle tree, the length and cost of the signature are O(logN), where N is the total number of users.
Join: After the joining process of the Groth's group signature scheme, GM adds the user's public key V k to the public commitment C by computing C=C•e(G k , V k ). Thus the new user's public key is accumulated into the public commitment C. Then the GM has to give the user the witness that his public key is indeed in C. GM computes
( , ) Later this user has to prove he is not revoked by showing that he holds such a witness in a zero knowledge way. GM also add V k xk to the A-List, then non-revoked user can update his witness by W j =W j V k xk . Sign: Before signing, member should update his witness according to A-List and D-list. Then besides the normal signature of the Groth's scheme, User k has to prove he is not revoked by showing that his public key V k is in C. This can be done by proving that he has a W k so that:
User k can prove his membership in two different ways with different levels of privacy, i.e. linkable and unlinkable. One is proving he is the K th user by
, so verifier can know that the signer is the K th user. This way is very efficient, signing cost is constant O (1) , and the verification cost is also O (1) .
To attain stronger anonymity, the other way is to show
Note that this time the user doesn't make the G K public. Instead he makes a commitment to the G K , then he prove that it is one of G 1 ,G 2 ,G 3 ,G 4 ,…,G n by showing he hold a SPS signature on the committed value. This is the set membership proof trick we mentioned above. But this time the signing and verification cost is O(logN), since the SPS is based on Merkle tree and the height of this tree is logN. Note that this stronger anonymity can also be done by using standard model ring signature techniques such as [15, 16] , instead of this set membership proof trick. But the performance could be worse to O(N) or O(N 1/2 ). Note that in these proofs, the V k should be the same with the one used in normal Groth's group signature. This can be done easily by using the same commitment to V k .
Verify: Verifier should get the latest public commitment C. Then just verify if the ZK proof above is valid or not, after the normal verification procedure of the Groth's scheme.
Revoke: GM can revoke the signing right of User k by updating the public commitment C with C=C/e(G k ,V K ). Of course the non-revoked user has to update their witness too.
For this purpose, GM adds the value V k xk to the D-List, now non-revoked user j can update his witness by W j =W j / V k xk .
IV. SECURITY
As mentioned above, the trapdoor homomorphic commitment scheme is proved to be secure based on DBP (Double Pairing) assumption.
It is clear that DBP works in asymmetric bilinear groups. We used a variant of the commitment schemes, which worked in symmetric bilinear groups. But we cannot prove its security based on any standard assumption. But we do prove that the commitment scheme satisfy a weaker security based on ODBP (One side DBP) assumption, which is implied by the wellknown standard DLIN assumption. Proof: From Lemma 2, we see that the commitment cannot be opened to a chosen different message. But for a revoked user, his public key V i is deleted from the accumulator commitment C. For legitimate signature, he needs an opening of C to his public key V i , which is generated by him and the GM in the joining protocol. But as discussed above, this is impossible as long as the ODBP assumption holds. □
V. EFFICIENCY
See Table I for a comparison of efficiency between different revocable group signatures. Note that in our scheme, verification of linkable signature takes O(1) time, while unlinkable signature takes O(logN) time. It can be seen that our scheme is not very efficient compared with other revocable signatures. But it is the first general way of revocation for standard model group signature and based on standard assumption DLIN, and it can support two different kinds of linkability when signing, which could be an advantage in some scenarios such as trust computing [20] . In this paper, we present a novel and general method for the revocation of membership in standard model group signature. The idea is to mimic DA method which woks in ROM model, though ours works in standard model. But our scheme is not as efficient as the DA method, esp. the public key size is O(N), while it is O(1) in DA. Further research is needed to reduce the public key size to constant first. Second, our scheme is historydependent, which could be inefficient when lots of joining and revocation happen. A focus of further research could be carried out to remove the dependent on history, while still maintain the generality of our scheme.
